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a b s t r a c tBackground: The present liability system is not serving well childbearing women and newborns, maternity care clini-
cians, or those who pay for maternity care. Examination of evidence about the impact of this system on maternity care
led us to identify seven aims for a high-functioning liability system in this clinical context. Herein, we identify policy
strategies that are unlikely to meet the proposed criteria and contribute to needed improvements. A companion paper
considers more promising strategies.
Methods:We consideredwhether 25 strategies that have been used or proposed for improvement havemet or couldmeet
the seven aims. We used a best available evidence approach and drew on more recent empirical legal studies and health
services research about maternity care and liability, when available, and considered other studies when unavailable.
Findings: Fifteen strategies seem to have little potential to improve liability matters in maternity care. Despite support
for capping non-economic damages, a series of studies has found a modest impact at best on maternity care. Maternity-
speciﬁc studies also do not lend support to tort reforms collectively and several other speciﬁc tort reforms. Some tort
alternative and liability insurance reform strategies have narrow aims and are not policy priorities.
Conclusions: Caps on non-economic damages and other tort reforms have narrowaims and have beenmarginally effective
at best in the context of maternity care. Several other possible reforms similarly are not promising. Continued focus on
these strategies is unlikely to result in the high-performing liability system that maternity care stakeholders need.
Copyright  2013 by the Jacobs Institute of Women’s Health. Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction and Background
A new report, Maternity Care and Liability: Pressing Problems,
Substantive Solutions (Sakala, Yang, & Corry, 2013b), and an
overview of report highlights in this issue clarify that the current
liability system does not serve well childbearing women,
maternity care providers, or those who pay for the cost of
maternity care, which includes liability-related expenses. Policy
interventions are needed to better achieve a high-functioning
liability system. Effective strategies must address a broad set of
persistent challenges and
 Promote safe, high-quality maternity care consistent with
best evidence, and minimize avoidable harm;
 Minimize maternity professionals’ liability-associated fear
and disaffection;* Correspondence to: Dr. Carol Sakala, PhD, MSPH, Childbirth Connection, 260
Madison Avenue, 8th Floor, New York, NY 10016. Phone: þ1-212-777-5000;
fax: þ1-212-777-9320.
E-mail address: sakala@childbirthconnection.org (C. Sakala).
1049-3867/$ - see front matter Copyright  2013 by the Jacobs Institute of Women’
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.whi.2012.11.002 Avoid incentives for defensive maternity practice;
 Foster access to high-value liability insurance policies for all
maternity caregivers without restrictions or surcharges for
care supported by best evidence;
 Respond appropriately when women and newborns sustain
injury, and provide rapid, fair, efﬁcient compensation;
 Assist families with responsibility for costly ongoing care of
infants and women with long-term disabilities in a timely
manner and with limited legal expense; and
 Minimize legal and administrative costs (Sakala et al., 2013b).
Four major classes of reforms might be used to improve
liability matters: Tort, tort alternative, liability insurance, and
health care system reforms. Each encompasses diverse possible
strategies.Tort Reform
The legal framework and rules governing harm resulting from
medical malpractice have traditionally been matters for states Health. Published by Elsevier Inc.
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this tradition in nearly all states (Studdert, Mello, & Brennan,
2004). Primary aims of the measures have been to stabilize the
size of liability insurance premiums and the frequency and cost of
claims, and to deter behavior that is believed to accompany
malpractice pressure (Mello & Zeiler, 2008). Conventional tort
reforms generally address the size of awards, modify liability
rules, or limit access to courts (Studdert, Mello, & Brennan, 2004).
The evidence base for evaluating the effects of most tradi-
tional tort reforms acrossmedicine generally is large andmature.
Apart from caps on non-economic damages, better quality
studies across clinical areas have found relatively little evidence
that tort reforms have the desired impact on liability-related
concerns (Mello & Kachalia, 2010). Numerous tort reforms have
also been evaluated in the maternity context. This paper
discusses eight speciﬁc tort reforms and the effect of multiple
tort reforms.
Tort Alternative Reform
Although the national debate about problems with the
liability systemhas largely focused onmerits of conventional tort
reform, some scholars and policymakers consider “tort alterna-
tive” reforms directed at making the liability system more efﬁ-
cient and responsive to injured patients. These strategies use
alternative mechanisms to resolve disputes, dispense with
negligence as the basis for compensation, and relocate legal
responsibility for injury at the institutional level (Studdert,
Mello, & Brennan, 2004). None of these reforms has been
widely adopted by states.
Liability Insurance Market Reform and Regulation
Reform of liability insurance has attracted less attention than
tort and tort alternative reforms (Sage, 2004). Liability crises that
trouble health professionals are ﬁrst and foremost insurance
crises with spikes in liability insurance cost and/or reductions in
the availability of coverage. It is important to dampen the volatile
cycle of premiums that rise and fall regardless of risk and to
ensure that insurance fosters high-quality care (Baker, 2005;
Sage, 2004). This cycle is amenable to policy intervention,
including better information, altered incentives, and appropriate
behavior constraints (Sage, 2005). Liability insurance reforms
focus on direct insurance industry regulations, government
acting as insurers, and government-sponsored pooling arrange-
ments.We found no controlled studies that have investigated the
effectiveness of liability insurance reform in general or in the
maternity ﬁeld.
Health Care Reforms
Finally, there is growing awareness that reform of the delivery
and organization of health care can impact liability outcomes
and a valuable track record in maternity care.
Methods
We used a best available evidence approach to help clarify the
potential for speciﬁc strategies to meet the seven proposed aims
of a high-functioning liability system. Finding no systematic
reviews or experimental studies, we preferred studies that took
into account potential competing predictor variables and con-
founding factors within empirical legal studies and healthservices research traditions. We preferred studies speciﬁcally
about maternity care and liability, and considered more general
studies when maternity-speciﬁc research was unavailable. We
preferred results from the current or previous liability cycle but,
when unavailable, consulted earlier studies. We preferred
national or multistate studies to state-level studies. We excluded
studies from other countries. We searched PubMed and Lex-
isNexis, with widely varying search terms due to the diverse
topics. The search results, health care news sources, journal table
of contents notiﬁcation services, and referees also pointed to
relevant studies. In the absence of better quality empirical
sources, we consulted theoretical analyses and commentaries
and made judgments, indicated as such, about plausibility of
addressing priority aims.
We deemed strategies that have been shown to have little or
no impact or may plausibly be expected to have limited impact,
in consideration of the breadth of liability system aims, to be of
low policy priority for further implementation and evaluation.Results
We evaluated 25 different strategies that might lead to
a higher functioning liability system in maternity care, across the
four major categories. Nine tort reform, one alternative tort
reform, and ﬁve liability insurance reform strategies did not
meet our criteria for policy priorities and are covered here.
Strategies that did meet our criteria, including all of the health
care reform strategies, are covered in the companion article in
this issue (Sakala, Yang, & Corry, 2013a). Table 1 summarizes the
current understanding of the degree to which more limited
strategies do or could help to achieve the seven aims described.Tort Reform
Tort Reforms Collectively
Two multivariable studies measured the additive effect of
multiple tort reforms on the supply of obstetrician-gynecologists,
out of concern that liability pressure adversely reduces supply:
 Yang, Studdert, Subramanian, and Mello (2008) evaluated
the association between a series of tort reforms and two
measures of obstetrician-gynecologist supply (number of
obstetrician-gynecologists per 10,000 births and number of
obstetrician-gynecologists per 100,000 women of child-
bearing age) across all states andWashington, DC, from 1991
to 2003. They examined 10 reforms: Attorney fee limits,
collateral source rule, damages caps (four types), periodic
payment, expert witness rule, joint and several liability
modiﬁcation, and pretrial screening. They found no rela-
tionship between the collective effect of tort reforms and
obstetrician-gynecologist supply.
 Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005) examined the impact of tort
reforms on the growth of physicians at the state level from
1985 to 2001. They found that obstetrician-gynecologist
supply increased by 2% in states that had adopted reforms
that might directly reduce malpractice awards relative to
states with no reforms. Indirect reforms were associated
with a 0.5% decrease in supply. The supply was increased by
2% in states with both direct and indirect reforms. Compa-
rable increases were much higher when this specialty’s
results were combined with those of four other specialties:
Table 1
Evidence Summary: Effects of Least Promising Reforms on Diverse Aims of Liability System
Interventions Aims
[ Safe, High-
Quality Care
Y Clinician
Fear, Distress
Y Defensive Practice,
Practice Variation
[ Public Interest
Liability Insurance
[ Appropriate
Response to
Injury
[ Help for Infants,
Women with
Disabilities
Y Liability and
Administrative
Costs
Tort reforms
Collective () ? ()* () () () ()
Attorney fee limits ()* () ()* () () ? ()
Caps on non-economic
damages
* ? *,y ()* () () ()*,y
Collateral source rule ()* () ()* () () () ()
Expert witness rule ()* () ()* () () () ()
Joint and several liability rule ()* ? ()* () () () ()
Periodic payment of awards ()* () ()* () () () ()
Pretrial screening ()* () ()* () () () ()
Statute of limitations () () () () () () ()
Tort alternative reform
Arbitration, mediation ? () () () ? ? ?
Liability insurance reforms
Joint underwriting associations ? () () ? () () ()
Liability insurance investment
regulation
() ? () ? () () ()
Liability insurance rate
regulation
() ? () ? () () ()
Liability premium subsidy () ? ()* () () () ()
Patient compensation funds () ? () () () () ()
Key:þ, Stronger evidence suggests strategy has this effect; (þ), Plausible that strategy has this effect and/or weaker evidence suggests that it does; , Stronger evidence
suggests strategy does not have this effect or hasmodest effect at best effect; (), Weaker evidence suggests that strategy does not have this effect or hasmodest effect at
best; or impact implausible in absence of evidence; ?, It is difﬁcult to anticipate actual impact.
* Support from assessment includes maternity-related data.
y Ratings, based on maternity care evidence, differ from those of Mello and Kachalia (2010), who reported a favorable effect in medical system overall.
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supply of obstetrician-gynecologists relative to other
physicians.
Evidence about the impact of multiple tort reforms has
focused only on obstetrician-gynecologist supply and found
a modest impact at best.Attorney fee limits
In medical malpractice, attorneys for the plaintiff usually
receive a fee only if their client wins the case. This “contingent
fee” arrangement, a ﬁxed percentage of the award (Inselbuch,
2001), provides incentives for attorneys to take a large enough
share of the payment for damages when they win to offset
lawsuits without compensation when they lose. Attorneys often
charge from 33% to 50% of the total award. Concern about fair-
ness to plaintiffs has led to legislative changes that target the
amount of money paid to the plaintiff attorney (Budetti &
Waters, 2005). However, such a reform could discourage attor-
neys from accepting meritorious cases owing to limits on
potential revenue.
A recent review found several well-designed studies
showing no effect in medicine generally of attorney fee limits
on claim frequency, claim payouts, liability premiums, and
physician supply, with more limited evidence also suggesting
no effect on defensive behavior and quality of care (Mello &
Kachalia, 2010). We found two recent, national, maternity-
speciﬁc studies:
 An analysis from 51 jurisdictions from 1991 to 2003 found
that attorney fee limits were neither associated with
measures of obstetrician-gynecologist supply (Yang et al.
2008), nor with mode of birth (total cesarean, primarycesarean, and vaginal birth after cesarean [VBAC] rates;
Yang, Mello, Subramanian, & Studdert, 2009), nor with ﬁve
health outcome measures (low 5-minute Apgar scores,
preterm birth, low birthweight, birth injury, infant
mortality, and maternal mortality; Yang, Studdert,
Subramanian, & Mello, 2012).
 In two models assessing the association between attorney
fee limits and death of newborns in the ﬁrst 6 days of life
across states from1980 to 2001, contingency fee restrictions
were associated with a 7% reduction in Black newborn
mortality, signiﬁcant only in models that did not include
state-speciﬁc trends, and had no relationship to White
newborn mortality (Klick & Stratmann, 2007).
Caps on non-economic damages
Payments made to individuals to compensate for damages
frommedical error are generally divided into economic and non-
economic damages. Economic damages usually consist of past
and future medical expenses for care and rehabilitation, as well
as lost wages or earnings potential, measured in monetary terms
(Levmore, 1994). Non-economic damages are more subjective
and compensate for such damages as loss of a family member
through “wrongful death,” past and future pain and suffering,
and mental anguish (Levmore, 1994).
The size of damage awards has become a major focus of state
legislation. The principal response has been to limit, or “cap,” the
amount of money that can be awarded in a malpractice suit,
versus leaving juries free to determine the size of awards. Leg-
islated caps have restricted the size of awards well below levels
otherwise awarded. Some states limit total recovery. More
commonly, they limit non-economic damages, such as the non-
economic cap of $250,000 enacted by California’s landmark
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (Budetti &
Waters, 2005).
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non-economic damages, whereas consumer advocates have
generally held that such limits, whichmay be set near the level of
a physician’s average annual income, are unfair to injured parties
and especially create burdens for those with more serious injury.
Further, caps may provide a disincentive for lawyers to take
clients with meritorious cases and reduce incentives for deter-
ring harm. About one ﬁfth of states have struck down caps on
non-economic damages as unconstitutional (American Medical
Association, 2009).
Many believe that limiting non-economic damages is the
most effective single tort reform that a state can enact (Studdert,
Mello, & Brennan, 2004). Summarizing the better studies across
all clinical areas, Mello and Kachalia found that non-economic
caps substantially reduce claim payments, may increase litiga-
tion costs, moderately constrain premium growth, may reduce
defensive assurance behaviors, and modestly increase physician
supply. They found the evidence to be unclear about possible
impact on the number of claims that plaintiff attorneys accept,
health insurance premium levels, and the quality of care (2010).
They did not consider most criteria included in Table 1.
A series of multivariable studies has assessed the impact of
caps on non-economic damages in maternity care. As detailed
below, consistent evidence suggests that the impact of non-
economic caps on damages in this context is minimal at best,
with a number of studies ﬁnding no beneﬁt and one identifying
harmful population effects. Any modest beneﬁts must be
balanced against questions about justice for injured women and
newborns and their families and other potentially more effective
ways of achieving desired aims.
National, multivariable studies suggest that non-economic
damages caps have a less clear and strong impact in the mater-
nity arena than in medicine generally:
 Premiums. An analysis of the association between caps and
liability premiums in all states and the District of Columbia
from 1999 to 2001 found that premiums of obstetrician-
gynecologists were not different in states with and
without non-economic caps. Premiums were about $15,000
lower in states with "hard" non-economic caps (no excep-
tions) than in states with “soft” non-economic caps (excep-
tions), but were not different in states with hard caps and no
caps (Guirguis-Blake, Fryer, Phillips, Szabat, & Green, 2006).
 Award sizes. In the National Practitioner Data Bank, non-
economic caps were not associated with malpractice
paymentsmade on behalf of obstetrician-gynecologists from
1990 to 2001 in all states and the District of Columbia (Currie
& MacLeod, 2008).
 Physician supply. An analysis of the county-level impact of
non-economic damages caps on obstetrician-gynecologist
supply per 100,000 women aged 15 to 44 from 1985 to
2000 found that caps above $250,000 were not associated
with an increase in obstetrician-gynecologist supply, overall
or in rural counties. Caps at $250,000 were not associated
with increased supply overall, but were associated with a 5%
increase in supply in rural areas (Encinosa &Hellinger, 2005).
 Physician supply. In an analysis of all 51 jurisdictions from
1991 to 2003, Yang and colleagues (2008) found that four
different types of caps (caps limiting punitive damage
awards and caps on non-economic damages: At $250,000,
between $250,000 and $500,000, and greater than
$500,000) were not associated with two measures of
obstetrician-gynecologist supply. Physician supply. Chou and Lo Sasso (2009) found that state
caps onnon-economic damageswere not associatedwith the
initial practice settings of obstetrician-gynecologists who
completed their training in New York from 1998 to 2003.
 Hospital maternity units. A county-level analysis from 1985 to
2000 found that caps on non-economic damages were
associated with a slightly increased likelihood of a hospital
maternity unit (0.27% in all counties, 0.26% in non-
metropolitan counties; Zhao, 2007).
 Interventions and outcomes. An analysis of all 51 jurisdictions
from 1991 to 2003 found that VBAC rates were signiﬁcantly
higher and cesarean rates were signiﬁcantly lower in state
years when caps on non-economic damages were in force.
The effect size increased with the stringency of the cap: Caps
of $250,000 or less were associated with a 1.92 percentage
point higher VBAC rate, caps between $250,001 and
$500,000 with a 1.37 percentage point higher rate, and caps
above $500,000 with a 1.25 percentage point higher rate.
Higher caps on non-economic damages were associated
with lower total and primary cesarean rates (Yang et al.,
2009). However, caps were not associated with ﬁve
measures of adverse outcome (Yang et al., 2012). Yang and
associates (2009) estimated that a non-economic damages
cap at the $250,000 level would have averted 12,800
cesarean sections in the country in 2006 among the more
than 1.3 million such procedures performed that year
(Martin et al., 2009).
 Interventions and outcomes. Using birth certiﬁcate data from
1989 to 2001, Currie and MacLeod (2008) reported
a contrary result, that caps on non-economic damages were
associated with a 5% increase in the likelihood of cesarean
section and a 6% increase in preventable childbirth compli-
cations. They did not ﬁnd an associationwith labor induction
or augmentation or low 5-minute Apgar scores, used as
a measure of newborn health.
 Outcome. An analysis across all states from 1980 to 2001
found that non-economic damages caps were associated
with a 6% decrease in Black newborn deaths in the ﬁrst 6
days of life, signiﬁcant only in models that did not include
state-speciﬁc trends. No reduction was found for White
newborn death in the ﬁrst 6 days (Klick & Stratmann, 2007).
In addition to the national studies, an analysis of the impact of
California’s $250,000 non-economic damages cap on high-end
jury verdicts found a distinctive impact in the maternity context.
The caps’ ﬁscal impact differed across different types of injuries.
Caps were associated with lowest reductions in total awardsdin
the range of 2% to 5%dfor the largest and most costly class of
claims against obstetrician-gynecologists, newborns with severe
neurological injuries, versus much greater reductions for other
types of injuries averaging 67% (Studdert, Yang, & Mello, 2004).
The impact of non-economic damages caps on various mater-
nitycaremeasures seems tobemodest at best. Studies of impacton
cesarean rates are contradictory,with thebest caseavoidinga fairly
smallportionofcesareans.Anational study foundnoimpactonﬁve
measuresofoutcome, another foundreducedBlacknewborndeath
in one model but not another, and a third associated caps with an
increase in preventable complications.
Collateral source rule
The longstanding practice of letting injured persons collect
the full amount of judgments in lawsuits even if insurance or
some other “collateral source” pays for part of their losses raises
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purchase insurance (Fleming, 1966). Some states require that
malpractice awards be reduced by amounts received from
collateral sources, which raises concerns about fairness to
plaintiffs. Others permit defendants to present evidence to the
jury about amounts available from collateral sources for possible
considerationwhen awarding damages (Budetti &Waters, 2005).
A recent review of better quality studies found fairly strong
evidence that the collateral source rule may reduce health
insurance premium levels, but is not related to the frequency of
claims, payouts for claims, legal expenses, malpractice premium
levels, assurance defensive behaviors, physician supply, or
outcomes of care (Mello & Kachalia, 2010). Four relatively recent
national multivariable studies speciﬁc to maternity care found
modest impact of this reform at best, with one reporting an
adverse association:
 An analysis from51 jurisdictions from1991 to 2003 found no
signiﬁcant relationship between collateral source offset and
multiple measures of obstetrician-gynecologist supply
(Yang et al., 2008), mode of birth (Yang et al., 2009), or birth
outcome (Yang et al., 2012).
 Investigating national data from 1989 to 2001, Currie and
MacLeod (2008) found that collateral source offset was not
associated with the likelihood of cesarean section, labor
induction or augmentation, preventable labor and birth
complications, or low 5-minute Apgar scores.
 A county-level analysis from 1985 to 2000 found that
mandatory offset of collateral sources was associated with
a slightly increased likelihood of having a hospital maternity
unit in the county: 0.60% for all counties, and 0.76% in non-
metropolitan counties (Zhao, 2007).
 In two models assessing the association between collateral
source rule and death of newborns in the ﬁrst 6 days of life
across states from 1980 to 2001, the collateral source rule
was associated with a 5% to 7% increase in mortality among
Black newborns. The investigators suggest that this rule may
weaken pressure to avoid harm by reducing the likelihood
that attorneys will accept clients (Klick & Stratmann, 2007).
Expert witness rule
Many believe that the tort system has fostered “professional”
medical witnesses who frequently testify in lawsuits and
compromise their integrity to provide testimony supporting the
side that engaged their services. This perception has undermined
conﬁdence of obstetricians and other health professionals in the
fairness of the negligence system (Fisher, Dombrowski, Jaszczak,
Cook, & Sokol, 1995).
An analysis of expert physicianwitnesses in closed neurologic
birth injury cases from 34 states and the District of Columbia
from 1990 to 2005 found that 71 “frequent witnesses” (testifying
in 10 or more cases) participated in 89% of all neurological birth
injury cases. Also, 79% of the frequent witnesses worked at least
three fourths of the time for either plaintiffs or defendants
(Kesselheim & Studdert, 2006). Although these results have been
interpreted as a sign of problems in the expert witness system, it
is unreasonable to expect witness equipoise. Attorneys maywish
to avoid working with experts with a history of testifying for the
other side. Expert witnesses may align consistently with one side
owing to genuine differences in understanding of basic and
controversial clinical questions. Further, repeat witnesses have
a history of previous depositions and trial testimony under oath
and are obliged to adhere to past testimony to avoid dismissal oftheir current testimony. Also, peer pressure and fear of retribu-
tion for testifying on behalf of plaintiffs may limit some
witnesses to working on behalf of defendants.
In response to unease that physicians are being judged by
laypersons on juries guided only by such experts, some states
have established speciﬁc standards for medical experts (Budetti
& Waters, 2005). Although variation in the approach to expert
witness rule across jurisdictions poses challenges for a national
analysis, the sole recent national multivariable study in the
maternity ﬁeld did not detect an impact of this reform:
 In an analysis of data from 51 jurisdictions from 1991 to 2003
expert witness rule was not associated with twomeasures of
increased obstetrician-gynecologist supply (Yang et al.,
2008), three measures of mode of birth (Yang et al., 2009),
or six measures of birth outcome (Yang et al., 2012).Joint and several liability rule modiﬁcation
In the traditional tort system, all defendants being sued for
negligence are subjected to “joint and several” liability, which
means that any defendant who is found to have been responsible
for a negligent injury can be required to pay the full amount of an
award, regardless of others deemed to be at fault (Levmore,1994).
The rationale is that it is fairer to require a negligent party to pay
a disproportionate share of an injury than to deny compensation
to the victim. However, there are concerns that this rule creates
an incentive to sue as many defendants as possible, particularly
large institutions such as hospitals, to ensure that there are
sufﬁcient assets to pay damages, and could create barriers to
access to needed consultations. A recent review of better quality
studies across all clinical areas concluded that this reform does
not reduce claims payouts, legal expenses, and malpractice
premiums, and does not improve physician supply and quality of
care, with more limited evidence suggesting no effect on claims
frequency and defensive behaviors (Mello & Kachalia, 2010).
We found three relatively recent studies of the impact of this
reform in the maternity ﬁeld:
 In their analysis of data from 51 jurisdictions from 1991 to
2003, Yang and associates found that joint and several
liability reform was not associated with multiple measures
of obstetrician-gynecologist supply (2008), mode of birth
(2009), or health outcome (2012).
 Investigating national birth data from 1989 to 2001, Currie
and MacLeod (2008) found that joint and several liability
reformwas associated with a 7% decrease in the likelihood of
cesarean section and a 13% decrease in preventable
complications of labor and birth, but not with labor induc-
tion or augmentation or with a low 5-minute Apgar score.
They argue that this reform aligns malpractice risk more
closely with the physician’s own actions and may help to
increase hospital accountability.
 In twomodels assessing the association between abolition of
joint and several liability and death of newborns in the ﬁrst 6
days of life across states from 1980 to 2001, the reform was
associated with a small increase inwhite newbornmortality,
which was not robust, however, to inclusion of state-speciﬁc
trends (Klick & Stratmann, 2007).
Periodic payment of awards
Defendants who are found to have negligently injured
a person have often paid all damages that are owed in a lump
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include estimated lost income, future medical expenses, or other
future losses, it may be unfair to require immediate payment of
all damages, including some that may never materialize (Budetti
& Waters, 2005). Liability insurers can beneﬁt by spreading
payments over a longer period and retaining any that are unused.
Periodic payments also allow insurers to more accurately predict
their losses and in turn set more consistent insurance rates.
However, in a Florida sample, a large proportion of families with
a child with birth injuries used up-front payments for major
purchases such as vehicles and homes that are adapted to
persons with disabilities (Sloan et al., 1993). Nonetheless, these
concerns have led some states to permit periodic payment of
some damages.
A recent review found limited research suggesting that
periodic payment does not reduce claims payouts or improve
physician supply in medicine generally. Conclusions could not be
drawn about its relationship with legal expenses, defensive
assurance behaviors, and quality of care, and results were mixed
regarding claims frequency and liability insurance costs (Mello &
Kachalia, 2010). Two relatively recent national multivariable
studies found no beneﬁt for this reform in the context of
maternity services:
 In their analysis of data from 51 jurisdictions from 1991 to
2003, Yang and co-workers found no association between
periodic payment andmeasures of obstetrician-gynecologist
supply (2008), mode of birth (2009), and birth outcome
(2012).
 A county-level analysis from 1985 to 2000 found that peri-
odic payment was not associated with increased likelihood
of having a hospital maternity unit in the county, nationally
and in non-metropolitan counties (Zhao, 2007).
Pretrial screening
Some states require or had required malpractice cases to be
screened by a medical review panel before the cases go to court.
Pretrial review is intended to identify cases that lackmerit and to
encourage the parties to resolve the case without litigation
(Levmore, 1994). Some states permit results of the pretrial
review to be admitted as evidence if the case proceeds to court
(Budetti & Waters, 2005). A recent review of the better quality
evidence in medicine generally found that results of a few well-
designed studies suggest that pretrial screening panels are not
effective in reducing claims cost, claims frequency, and liability
insurance premiums, and may reduce defensive behavior. The
evidence was unclear with respect to possible relationship with
legal expenses, physician supply, health insurance premium
levels, and quality of care (Mello & Kachalia, 2010). Similarly,
Struve (2004) found that there is no good evidence that potential
advantages of pretrial screening have been realized, and many
states that had adopted this reform have repealed or invalidated
it. Two relatively recent national multivariable studies assessed
the impact of pretrial screening in maternity care:
 A national analysis of data from 51 jurisdictions from 1991 to
2003 found that pretrial screening panels were associated
with a small (0.07%) but signiﬁcant positive effect on the
VBAC rate and a signiﬁcant negative effect on cesarean
(0.28%) and primary cesarean (0.27%) rates (Yang et al.,
2009). However, this reform was not associated with
measures of obstetrician-gynecologist supply (Yang et al.,
2008) or of birth outcome (Yang et al., 2012). A multiple regression analysis found no relationship in 2002
between the availability of mandatory or optional submis-
sion panels at the state level and annual malpractice insur-
ance premiums of obstetrician-gynecologists, along with
numerous other measures of liability system cost, timeli-
ness, and efﬁciency across all clinical areas (White, Pettiette,
Wiggins, & Kiss, 2008).
Statute of limitations
Another type of access constraint involves shortening the
length of time that patients have to ﬁle a malpractice suit after an
event giving rise to a claim (Levmore, 1994), known as the
“statute of limitations.” Because some injuries do not manifest
themselves immediately, these statutes often extend the time for
bringing a lawsuit so that an injury can reasonably be discovered.
Whereas a “statute of limitations” for a 25-year-old is on average
2 years, it is 12 years for a newborn (Shea, Scanlan, Nilsson,
Wilson, & Mehlman, 2008).
Malpractice insurance companies need sufﬁcient reserves to
cover potential lawsuits, and the longer the period of time for
possible cases to arise, the greater are challenges for planning
reserves. Prolonged uncertainty about liability generally
increases premium levels and can be unsettling to clinicians.
Most states have shortened the period that parties in general
have to bring a negligent injury lawsuit (Budetti &Waters, 2005).
A recent review of better quality studies in medicine overall
found a fair amount and strength of evidence showing no impact
of shortened statute of limitations on claims payments, defensive
assurance behavior, or physician supply, and inadequate
evidence to understand impact on legal expenses and quality of
care. Limited evidence suggested some reduction in liability
insurance premiums. Results were equivocal for claims
frequency (Mello & Kachalia, 2010). We found no empirical
research speciﬁc to care of childbearing women and newborns.
Tort Alternative Reform
Arbitration, mediation
The traditional tort process, which is harsh for both the
aggrieved and defending parties, has been likened to war
(Johnson, 2000). By contrast, mediation and arbitration offer
potential to save time and expense associated with protracted
legal struggles, soften the experience for the involved parties,
and help to preserve relationships (Dauer & Marcus, 1997;
Johnson, 2000).
Some states have established an alternative to going to court
by permitting physicians to require that disputes with their
patients be resolved by a binding decision of a third-party arbi-
trator, rather than by judicial process. Another approach makes
arbitration voluntary, but enforces arbitration agreements when
made or permits the ﬁndings to be introduced into court (Budetti
&Waters, 2005). Some scholars favor a court-ordered arbitration
model, which is well-established in other litigation contexts and
constitutional (Metzloff, 1992). Arbitration relies on an arbitrator
rather than a judge or jury and typically rests on traditional tort
theory of liability.
Mediation, a more ﬂexible negotiation facilitated by a neutral
third party, emphasizes autonomy, informed decision making,
and conﬁdentiality in reaching a mutually acceptable decision. It
has greater potential for avoiding the harshness of the traditional
tort system and promoting learning and healing (Todres, 2006).
Most support for these strategies is hypothetical. An earlier
study with state-level data from 1974 to 1986 found that
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association with liability premiums and malpractice claim
frequency or severity (Zuckerman, Bovbjerg, & Sloan, 1990). A
pilot project in New York City involved 19 mediated cases and
found satisfaction among the parties, irrespective of outcome,
settlements in most cases, and attorneys on both sides esti-
mating that they spent about one tenth the time that would have
been required to prepare for a trial (Hyman & Schechter, 2006).
Interviews with participants in 31 mediated lawsuits across 11
hospitals found satisfaction across many parties and identiﬁca-
tion of ways to improve hospital safety. Although mediation
could potentially aid healing, improve patient care, shorten liti-
gation processes, and reduce costs, the absence of physician
participation limited impact on patient safety (Hyman, Liebman,
Schechter, & Sage, 2010). New York State is currently piloting
a “judge-directed negotiation” model through the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality Patient Safety and Medical
Liability Reform Demonstration Projects program (2010). The
effect of arbitration and mediation on the maternity ﬁeld does
not seem to have been studied. Mediation may be an important
tool when bundled with other strategies, such as disclosure and
apology (see companion article; Sakala et al., 2013a).
Liability Insurance Reform
Joint underwriting associations
Legislators who perceive medical liability coverage to be
unavailable or unaffordable may create a risk-sharing mecha-
nism, such as a Joint Underwriting Association (JUA), to serve as
a market of last resort. In a JUA, a state authorizes or requires one
or more carriers to issue medical liability insurance policies to
providers that are unable to obtain insurance from the voluntary
market (Danzon, Epstein, & Johnson, 2004). JUAs may increase
access to insurance coverage (Sloan, Mathews, Conover, & Sage,
2005), but do not address the price or affordability of the
insurance product.
With relatively small risk pools formidwifery and birth center
liability insurance, the potential for a single large payout to result
in unaffordable premium rates, and the rise of physician- and
hospital-focused providers of liability insurance, JUAs may be
important mechanisms for making coverage reliably available to
midwives and birth centers. The Washington State legislature
established a JUA for midwives and birth centers (Myers &
Myers-Ciecko 2004; available: http://www.washingtonjua.
com). Another JUA model offers liability insurance to diverse
entities, inclusive of maternity service providers. For example,
the Pennsylvania Professional Liability JUA offers coverage to
physicians, certiﬁed nurse-midwives, and birth centers (avail-
able: http://www.pajua.com). Evaluation of JUA contributions to
maternity services, including the potential for this model to
foster reliable coverage across the full complement of maternity
service providers, is warranted.
Investment regulation
Regulators have overseen insurers’ investments. In 1990, the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners issued a model
law with guidelines for insurer asset investment. Several states
adopted that law or similar restrictions (Nordman, Cermak, &
McDaniel, 2004). In 1996, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners adopted a more comprehensive model law
covering all insurer investments, later weakened if a sound
investment plan could be demonstrated (Nordman et al., 2004).
Regulators are authorized to intervene if an insurer fails to meetgeneral requirements. Insurance companies are required to
provide quarterly ﬁnancial statements to regulators (Hoyt &
Powell, 2006). We found no evaluations of this strategy. In the
best case, investment regulation would address a small portion
of liability challenges in maternity care.
Rate regulation
About one third of states use insurance premium rate regu-
lation, which ideally keeps prices high enough to prevent
insolvency and low enough to make insurance relatively
affordable. No comparative studies have assessed this strategy
(Mello, 2006).
In addition to incremental rating regulation strategies
(Brierton, 2004; Nelson, 2000), Geistfeld (2005) proposed
setting a uniform premium level for all medical professionals in
a jurisdiction, regardless of specialty or geographic area. This
would have favorable implications for maternity providers and
others in clinical areas at higher liability risk and for geographic
areas and types of services with small, vulnerable risk pools (e.g.,
midwives, birth centers). It would directly address the deep
sense of liability system injustice that is widespread in the
obstetrics community. Geistfeld (2005) observed that setting
premium levels on the basis of specialty, geographic location,
and claims experiences could create provider incentives to
reduce error and protect patient interests. In the best case, rate
regulationwould address a small portion of liability challenges in
maternity care.
Premium subsidy
To address concerns about the affordability of liability insur-
ance and access to maternity care, several states have considered
or implemented providing direct subsidies to clinicians for
liability premiums (Smits, King, Rdesinski, Dodson, & Saultz,
2009). We found one evaluation of a maternity caregiver
premium subsidy program. Owing to concerns about access to
maternity caregivers, especially in rural areas, Oregon instituted
a malpractice premium subsidy program in 2004 for
obstetrician-gynecologists, family physicians, general practi-
tioners, and certiﬁed nurse-midwives. Afterward, the number of
clinicians providing maternity services in all groups, most
prominently among family physicians and general practitioners,
continued to decline in the state. A multidisciplinary survey
found that access to malpractice premium subsidies was not
associated with continued provision of maternity services even
though the groups had identiﬁed liability premium costs as the
leading factor in discontinuation of maternity services 4 years
earlier (Smits et al., 2009).
Patient compensation funds
Some states have adopted the insurance reform of creating
patient compensation funds (PCFs). These limit health care
provider claims to a speciﬁed monetary level, regardless of the
size of an award, with the PCF covering amounts above that level
(Budetti & Waters, 2005). PCFs thus offer some reassurance
about costs to health care providers and their insurers.
A 2004 investigation identiﬁed nine states with PCFs and one
that had discontinued a PCF (Sloan et al., 2005). Typically,
liability premiums and investment returns, rather than state
subsidies, fund PCFs. Because health care providers pay
premiums to private primary insurers and surcharges to state
PCFs, this reform can be costly. Investigators found that PCFs
function as passive ﬁnancial intermediaries with no special
contribution to patient safety, loss prevention, or claims
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matters (Sloan et al., 2005).
In 2011, the New York State Legislature established a Medical
Indemnity Fund created from1.6% of hospital inpatientmaternity
care revenues to cover medical and other expenses of neurolog-
ically impaired newborns. Defendants or insurers are responsible
for all other costs. Because plaintiffs must establish provider
negligence and causation through the court system, the funddoes
not reduce litigation expenses or hasten resolution and payments
to families (Greater New York Hospital Association, 2011).
A recent assessment of the effects of PCFs in medicine
generally afﬁrmed that the limited contribution of current
models shifts liability cost burden away from health profes-
sionals and insurers, and noted that PCFs might include quality
improvement incentives and reduce legal and liability insurance
costs by incorporating disclosure and early offer programs (Mello
& Kachalia, 2010).Discussion
The effect of caps on non-economic damages has been well
studied within maternity care, with studies ﬁnding modest and
narrow impact at best. A smaller number of studies have
examined effects of several other traditional tort reforms within
maternity care, with generally disappointing results. Despite
strong interest in limiting payouts as a strategy for keeping
malpractice premiums in check, the relationship between the
two seems to be weak at best (Baicker & Chandra, 2005). With
one exception, remaining reforms considered here have not been
evaluated in the context of maternity care. However, there is
little more general support for these strategies. Where data are
sparse, even if the reforms proved to be effective at achieving
their aims, they would be of limited value owing to a narrow
focus relative to the range of aims that warrant the attention of
policy makers.
This investigation underscores the importance of conducting
liability research in speciﬁc clinical areas, as previously shown in
a study of newborn and emergency room injuries (Sloan et al.,
1993). Whereas evaluation of tort reforms collectively and with
respect to caps on non-economic damages have shown the
desired impact in medicine overall, their impact in maternity
care is modest at best.
Our investigation also clariﬁes the importance of ensuring
that liability reform strategies meet the needs of all key stake-
holder groups. Many strategies that have been pursued have
focused on clinician and liability insurer interests, with an indi-
rect relationship to interests of childbearing women and
newborns and those who pay for their care (Hyman & Silver,
2005). For desired effects, policy makers will need to imple-
ment and assess interventions with potential for multifaceted
impact, as discussed in the companion article in this issue (Sakala
et al., 2013a).Acknowledgments
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